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We examine the current wealth adequacy of older U.S. households using the 1998{2006 waves
of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). We nd that the median older U.S. household is
reasonably well situated, with a ratio of comprehensive net wealth to present value poverty-
line wealth of about 3.9 in 2006. About 18 percent of households, however, have less wealth
than would be needed to generate 150 percent of poverty-line income over their expected future
lifetimes. We see similar patterns of wealth adequacy when we examine ratios of annualized
comprehensive wealth to pre-retirement earnings. Comparing the leading edge of the baby
boomers in 2006 to households of the same age in 1998, we nd that the baby boomers show
slightly less wealth, in real terms, than their elders did, but still have appear to have adequate
resources at the median. Moreover, we nd a rising age prole of annualized wealth, even within
households over time and after controlling for other factors, suggesting that older households
are not spending their wealth as quickly as their survival probabilities are falling.
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11 Introduction
The imminent retirement of the baby boom generation, coming at a time of increasing uncertainty
about private pensions, Social Security, and Medicare, has led to a renewed interest in the adequacy
of retirement savings. A brief taxonomy of this research might include work assessing the nancial
preparedness of baby boomers,1 examinations of the saving behavior of older cohorts,2 calculations
and projections of earnings replacement rates,3 and comparisons of observed savings to predicted
behavior derived from stochastic life cycle models.4 The evidence on savings adequacy is mixed;
while some studies nd evidence of signicant undersaving, others conclude that retirement wealth
is either adequate or at least consistent with optimizing behavior. In this paper, we use recent panel
data to provide a detailed and comprehensive comparison of net wealth to benchmarks based on
poverty lines and pre-retirement earnings. According to these measures, we nd that the median
older U.S. household appears to be reasonably well situated and that the annual value of its resources
tends to rise with age. However, we do nd households with inadequate resources, particularly
among single baby boomers just approaching retirement.
We make several contributions to the literature on the adequacy of retirement wealth. First,
using the 1998{2006 waves of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), we provide a comprehensive
and up-to-date examination of the adequacy of household wealth, with a particular focus on the
leading edge of the baby boom generation. Second, we estimate age proles of our wealth and
adequacy measures over the full age distribution of older U.S. households. The age proles help us
understand the evolution of wealth and wealth adequacy over the course of retirement. Third, we
use the longitudinal nature of the data to analyze within-household changes in wealth over time.
We examine how annualized wealth changes in response to variables such as health status and
expectations about bequests and longevity. Finally, to test the robustness of our results to dierent
assumptions about fungibility and risk, we simulate the eects on wealth adequacy of falling home
prices and/or market frictions in consuming out of housing wealth, as well as the eects of rising
medical expenses, lower Social Security benets, and dierential mortality by marital status and
education.
We construct our broad measure of household resources by augmenting conventional denitions
of net wealth with the actuarial present values of Social Security, dened benet plans, annuities,
life insurance, Veterans' Benets, SSI, Food Stamps, and other welfare, plus (for current workers)
future wages and other compensation.5 To convert this wealth into an annual measure of total
1See CBO (1993); Bernheim (1992); Lusardi and Mitchell (2007); Wol (2007).
2See Gale and Pence (2006); Haveman, Holden, Wolfe, and Sherlund (2006); Haveman, Holden, Wolfe, and Ro-
manov (2007); Hurd and Rohwedder (2006); Wol (2002, 2007).
3See Bernheim (1992); Munnell and Soto (2005); Mitchell and Moore (1998); Moore and Mitchell (2000).
4See Engen, Gale, and Uccello (1999, 2005); Scholz, Seshadri, and Khitatrakun (2006).
5Earlier studies have included estimates of DB and Social Security wealth, but not the other components. See
Gustman, Mitchell, Samwick, and Steinmeier (1999); Gustman and Steinmeier (1999); Haveman, Holden, Wolfe, and
Sherlund (2006); Haveman, Holden, Wolfe, and Romanov (2007); Wol (2002, 2007).
2per-person household resources, we calculate the equivalent 
ow that would be available from a
hypothetical actuarially fair, joint-life annuity. Although annualized wealth is not an exact measure
of consumption possibilities, it allows us to analyze wealth in the spirit of the permanent income
framework used in life-cycle models of saving.6 The panel allows us to identify how annualized
wealth evolves within households over time.7
To establish an \absolute" benchmark of adequacy, we examine \poverty-line wealth," which
estimates the minimum level of wealth required to provide income equal to the poverty line over the
expected remaining lifetimes of each household member. Poverty lines are designed to re
ect the
aordability of core expenditures such as food, and as such, they embody a concept of a subsistence
level of income.8 Because, however, the poverty line is a bit unambitious as a bar against which
to measure wealth adequacy, in practice we use 1.5 times poverty and three times poverty as the
relevant thresholds. As a \relative" benchmark of adequacy, we compare the annualized value of
wealth to a measure of pre-retirement earnings.9
By these measures, we nd that the median older U.S. household is reasonably well situated,
with a \poverty ratio" of about 3.9 in 2006. However, we nd that about 18 percent of households
have less wealth than would be needed to generate 150 percent of poverty-line income over their
expected future lifetimes. We nd a median \replacement rate" of about 105 percent, with about
13 percent of households experiencing replacement rates of less than 50 percent. Comparing the
leading edge of the baby boomers in 2006 to households of the same age in 1998, we nd that the
baby boomers show slightly less wealth, in real terms, than their elders did, and single boomers
show a bit higher incidence of \inadequacy" than did their elders. Nonetheless, the median single
boomer appears to have adequate resources. Moreover, we nd a rising age prole of annualized
wealth, even within households over time and after controlling for other factors, suggesting that
older households are not spending their wealth as quickly as their survival probabilities are falling.
6The Euler conditions governing intertemporal consumption decisions in the life cycle model only require that the
marginal utility of consumption be smoothed over time. Changes in family composition, precautionary saving against
health shocks, bequest motives, and the substitution of leisure for consumption can generate sharp deviations from
the simplest \consumption smoothing" interpretation of the theory.
7Haveman, Holden, Wolfe, and Romanov (2007) use the New Beneciary Survey and the 1991 New Beneciary
Followup to study changes over time for an older cohort. As far as we know, ours is the rst study to provide a
careful analysis of levels and changes in wealth for the full age distribution of older U.S. households, including the
leading edge of the baby-boom cohort.
8Wol (2002), Haveman, Holden, Wolfe, and Sherlund (2006) and Haveman, Holden, Wolfe, and Romanov (2007)
compare annuitized retirement wealth to poverty lines at a point in time, but they do not trace the expected evolution
of a given household's poverty line over retirement.
9Note that our poverty-line wealth and annualized wealth measures are expected values, and abstract from the
utility impact of uncertainty surrounding asset returns, medical expenses, and the length of life.
32 Measuring the Adequacy of Retirement Wealth
2.1 Previous Notions of Adequacy
A commonly used measure of adequacy is the replacement rate, generally dened as post-retirement
income relative to pre-retirement income (see Bernheim, 1992; Munnell and Soto, 2005; Mitchell and
Moore, 1998). Using this approach, wealth is said to be adequate if it is sucient to generate a given
replacement rate. An advantage of this approach is that it measures resources in retirement relative
to income in working life, so it captures the notion that changes in resources after retirement are
of particular interest. Replacement rates, however, do not provide a measure of absolute adequacy.
A low-income household can have a high replacement rate but still be in poverty throughout
retirement.
In addition, the threshold replacement rate against which to measure adequacy is necessarily
arbitrary. In the literature, the benchmark has typically ranged from 70 percent to 100 percent,
but it has not been explicitly calibrated to standard models of saving. In general, income needs are
often presumed to be lower after retirement, due to the absence of payroll taxes and other work-
related expenses. But the household's post-retirement consumption problem diers in a much
broader sense, due to a signicant drop in the price of leisure (which could either increase or
decrease consumption), the discounting eect of declining survival probabilities, and the ability to
nance consumption out of savings as well as income. As a result, there is no clear theoretical
replacement rate against which to measure the adequacy of wealth, and replacement rates are
not really comparable across households: a relatively low replacement rate is not necessarily an
indication of inadequate savings, and a relatively high rate does not necessarily indicate adequacy.
Nonetheless, some standard must be applied to gauge adequacy, and the replacement rate (in
our case, the ratio of annualized wealth to pre-retirement earnings) provides a rough measure of
expected post-retirement consumption possibilities relative to pre-retirement possibilities.
A dierent approach is to compare wealth patterns in the data with optimal accumulation
patterns from a stochastic life cycle model (see Engen, Gale, and Uccello, 1999, 2005; Scholz,
Seshadri, and Khitatrakun, 2006). The advantage of this method is that it derives from theoretical
principles: working households save in order to smooth the marginal utility of consumption over
their expected lifetimes. The stochastic model recognizes that each household experiences a unique
set of shocks to earnings and expected mortality over the life cycle, and thus low levels of observed
wealth may be consistent with optimal behavior once we account for individual realizations of
life cycle shocks. These papers nd that most households prepare adequately for retirement, by
this measure, with actual saving patterns in the neighborhood of what the life cycle model would
predict. For example, Scholz, Seshadri, and Khitatrakun (2006) nd that more than 80 percent of
the households in the HRS saved more than their optimal life-cycle wealth targets, and that the
decits for most of those saving below the target were small.
4Interpreting the results of these models, however, can be tricky. Stochastic life-cycle models gen-
erate optimal consumption paths that are conditional on a particular set of assumptions regarding
mortality, preferences, and the sources and sizes of random shocks. To take well-known examples,
decision rules for consumption are quite sensitive to dierent values of the coecient of relative risk
aversion, and the presence of bequest motives can substantially alter post-retirement consumption
paths. Moreover, the concept of optimality does not fully address the issue of adequacy: it might
be optimal for model households who receive bad shocks to arrive at retirement with no resources
outside of Social Security, but this wealth could nonetheless be inadequate relative to an absolute
criterion such as a poverty line.
2.2 Our Measures of Adequacy
2.2.1 Comprehensive Wealth Relative to Poverty-Line Wealth
Our rst measure of adequacy compares comprehensive wealth to the actuarial present value of
future poverty lines. Poverty-line wealth can be interpreted as the minimum level of wealth that
would be sucient to nance consumption equal to the expected poverty line over the expected
remaining lifetimes of the household members.10 The poverty lines are taken from the U.S. Census
Bureau (Census, 2008) and vary with the number of adult members and their ages. For simplicity,
we model four possible poverty lines, corresponding to singles aged 65 or older, singles under 65,
couples in which at least one member is 65 or older, and couples in which both are under 65.
Poverty-line wealth therefore varies across households because of dierences in household-specic
poverty lines and dierences in the survival probabilities of the household members.
A disadvantage of using the poverty line as a measure of adequacy is that the ocial poverty
thresholds in the U.S. are imperfect and arbitrary. The thresholds are based on a denition of
absolute poverty established in 1964, which were computed as a multiple of (e.g. 3 times) the
Department of Agriculture's \economy food plan"|the least expensive of several plans that satised
basic nutritional requirements. Although the thresholds were revised in subsequent years, the
core concept of poverty as rooted in the aordability of adequately nutritious food expenditures
remains the same.11 This is, by construction, a limited and arbitrary measure of adequate resources,
because it excludes a great deal of information about the changing costs of living, such as housing
and medical expenses.12 Nonetheless, in addition to being a standard measure that is widely
used in public policy, the poverty line also provides a generally accepted method for assessing the
cost of a subsistence level of consumption, a notion conceptually distinct from a replacement rate
10Note that given uncertainty over medical expenses and length of life, poverty-line wealth does not guarantee
income equal to the poverty line throughout retirement, but only provides it in expected value.
11For more information on the history and denition of poverty thresholds, see Census (2008).
12The multiple of three is meant to capture subsistence-level consumption of all other (non-food) items and was
based on an estimate that about a third of low-income households' consumption was on food in the 1960s.
5or the optimality of savings. Moreover, the ocial poverty thresholds are adjusted to account
for household economies of scale and age, which enables us to incorporate basic life-cycle and
demographic eects in our analysis. However, because the poverty line itself is a noisy and somewhat
unambitious measure of adequate resources, we also report statistics on households for dierent
multiples of poverty wealth.
2.2.2 Annualized Wealth Relative to Pre-Retirement Earnings
We derive our measure of annualized wealth by imagining that a household uses all of its resources
to purchase an actuarially fair, joint life annuity with a last survivor payout rule. Each dollar of
this hypothetical annuity will pay $ in each subsequent year if both members are alive and $1 if
just one member is alive. Slightly modifying the formula for a joint-life annuity (see Brown and


















where T is the maximum lifespan, and Sm
t and S
f
t are the cumulative survival probabilities for each
member of the household, which depend on the ages of each member in period t. Assuming that
a household converts all of its comprehensive wealth, CWt, into such an annuity, the annualized
value of wealth, ACWt, will be given by ACWt = CWt=pt. When both members of a household are
alive, the annuity pays ACWt, where  < 2 represents economies of scale within the household.13
When just one member is alive, the annuity pays ACWt. Annualized wealth rises with the real
interest rate r and falls with increased longevity.
There are four things to note about this measure. First, by itself, it assumes zero bequest
motives and a willingness to fully consume all forms of wealth, including nonnancial forms such as
housing, businesses, and vehicles.14 Because it unclear whether households actually use all of these
forms of wealth to support retirement consumption, we present a robustness exercise in which we
show how wealth adequacy changes if we count only half of nonnancial wealth.
Second, it is calculated as if it were an actuarially fair annuity with no fees, loads, or expense
charges, despite the well-known imperfections in the market for private annuities (e.g. see Mitchell,
Poterba, Warshawsky, and Brown, 1999). That is, it overstates consumption possibilities to the
13Following Haveman, Holden, Wolfe, and Sherlund (2006) and Haveman, Holden, Wolfe, and Romanov (2007), we
use =1.67 to capture economies of scale within married households.
14There is sometimes a debate among researchers about whether retirees are willing to consume their housing
wealth (e.g. see Bernheim, 1992; Mitchell and Moore, 1998). Financial products that facilitate such consumption,
such as reverse mortgages, are growing but are not yet widespread. Retirees can also consume housing by downsizing
(i.e. selling their homes and moving to less-expensive quarters or living with relatives). Coronado, Maki, and Weitzer
(2007) nd that a substantial fraction of older households appear to liquidate some home equity when moving,
suggesting that some older households do consume housing wealth in retirement.
6extent that it is based on a product that is not really available in the market. Households could
theoretically calculate this measure themselves and consume accordingly even in the presence of
annuity-market imperfections; however the \self-annuitizing" strategy would not provide insurance
against unexpectedly long life.
Third, the measure is a rst moment and makes no adjustment for typical sources of risk facing
older households, including asset returns, longevity, health costs, and future changes to social
insurance programs. Later in the paper, we explore the sensitivity of our results to medical costs,
changes to Social Security, and alternative discount rates.15
Finally, the present value calculations used to construct comprehensive wealth assume that
households are able to process somewhat complex information about the discounted present values
of their Social Security benets, private pension payments, annuities, and other transfer wealth.
Gustman and Steinmeier (2004, 2005), however, nd that respondents in the HRS tend to be poorly
informed about the future values of their Social Security and pension benets.16 While misinfor-
mation about future income can certainly aect saving behavior (e.g. pessimistic households may
accumulate more wealth than optimistic ones), it does not alter the realized stream of future Social
Security and pension benets. To the extent that households are misinformed about their future in-
come, our measure for pre-retirees is perhaps better thought of as an actual, rather than perceived,
indicator of total resources.
3 Data and Methodology
3.1 Data Source and Construction of Comprehensive Wealth
We use the 1998{2006 waves of the HRS.17 The HRS is a national panel data set consisting of an
initial (1992) sample of 7,600 households aged 51-61, with follow-ups every second year following.
In 1998, the HRS was merged with a similar survey covering older households, and younger cohorts
were also introduced. The youngest cohort (the \Early Baby Boomers," born 1948-1953) was
introduced in the 2004 wave. Our sample draws on all of these cohorts, but we restrict our analysis
to households with a respondent or spouse aged 55 years or older. Our nal sample size is 13,703
households in 1998 and 11,913 households in 2006.18
15Browning and Lusardi (1996) demonstrate that the introduction of a precautionary savings motive has similar
eects to a lower discount rate|it acts to reduce the annuity value of a given level of wealth.
16There is some evidence that respondents tend to be pessimistic about their future pension benets (Gustman
and Steinmeier, 2004). If this is the case, then one should expect, all else constant, that annualized wealth should fall
with age as households learn more about the amount of their benets. Despite this eect, we nd that annualized
wealth tends to rise with age.
17Specically, we use the RAND HRS Data File and the 1998{2006 RAND-Enhanced Fat Files, which are HRS
data les that have been compiled and processed by RAND, and are often easier to use than the raw HRS data les.
See the appendix for more details on our dataset and imputation methodology.
18As a check on the validity of our sample, we re-create our measure of comprehensive wealth using the 2004 Survey
of Consumer Finances (SCF), which includes the vast majority of the information necessary to create comparable
7To compute our measure of comprehensive wealth, we aggregate asset types that dier along
many dimensions. Some are held as stocks of wealth, such as corporate equities, bonds, bank
accounts, retirement accounts, houses and cars. Others consist of 
ow payments over time, such as
wages and other compensation (for current workers) and traditional pensions and Social Security
(for retirees). Further dierences include whether the type of wealth pays o only in expectation
(e.g. life insurance), includes protection against in
ation (e.g. Social Security), or terminates
payments with the death of the primary recipient (e.g. some pensions and annuities). In the
discussion that follows, we explain the various adjustments and calculations we use to combine
these dierent categories into a single measure of comprehensive wealth and show how we arrive at
our present value measure of poverty.19
We begin with a fairly straightforward measure of traditional net worth. Net (nonretirement)
nancial wealth is the sum of stocks, bonds, checking accounts, CDs, Treasury securities, and
other assets,20 less non-vehicle, non-housing debts (such as credit card balances, medical debts, life
insurance policy loans, or loans from relatives). Non-nancial wealth is the sum of housing, vehicles,
business, and investment real estate, less any outstanding debt secured by these assets. To these
measures we add retirement accounts such as IRA balances and balances from dened-contribution
pension plans from current and previous jobs.
Next we add the actuarial present values of dened benet pensions, Social Security, insurance,
annuities, welfare, and compensation.21 For each source of wealth, we project forward income
streams based on current or expected receipts of payments. We then discount these streams of pay-
ments, taking into account survival probabilities, cost-of-living adjustments (if any), and survivors'
benets. Our baseline calculations assume a real interest rate of 2.5 percent and a nominal rate of
4.5 percent.22
wealth measures. We then compare kernel density estimates of age and comprehensive wealth in SCF to estimates
in the 2004 wave of the HRS, where comprehensive wealth is dened analogously for the two surveys. The HRS and
the SCF densities are nearly identical for both age and comprehensive wealth, which leads us to conclude that the
wealth measures are reasonably similar, and thus our results are not an artifact of mismeasurement in the HRS.
19The appendix provides a detailed description of our methodology as it applies to each source of wealth. Note
that our measure of comprehensive wealth essentially treats all assets as perfectly fungible, an assumption which may
overstate the value of total wealth for some households (e.g. more liquid assets may make it easier for households to
pay for large out-of-pocket medical expenses such as nursing homes). In general, our goal is to measure total wealth,
and not necessarily the utility value of that wealth. To get a sense of the welfare implications of dierent types of
wealth, it is important to examine the components of wealth separately.
20\Other assets" is dened in the HRS to include (among other things) jewelry, money owed to the respondent
by others, collections, trusts or estates for which the respondent is a beneciary, and other annuities not elsewhere
mentioned (presumably including variable annuities).
21Expected welfare payments includes veteran's benets, food stamps, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and
other welfare. The appendix provides the explicit formulas used to calculate the present values.
22We abstract from taxes, because the complications involved in projecting DC withdrawals, asset returns, and
bequests (not to mention historical changes in the tax code, federal versus state taxes, and projections of future
tax changes) would take us fairly far aeld from the key points of our paper. The benchmarks that we use in the
adequacy calculations|i.e. poverty lines and pre-retirement earnings|are also pre-tax concepts, so we do not expect
tax considerations to fundamentally alter our key conclusions.
8For households containing a worker, an important component of comprehensive wealth is ex-
pected future earnings and employer matches to DC plans.23 We account for projected labor income
by assuming that earnings and the employer match grow at a one-percent real rate24 until the min-
imum of age 70 and the respondent's self-reported expected rst receipt of Social Security benets.
We then discount the stream of total compensation using the real interest rate minus one percent
(to account for the assumed real growth) and the relevant conditional survival probabilities. To
the extent workers experience dierent wage growth or work more or fewer years than they report,
their actual resources in retirement will dier from our projections.
As a benchmark against which to compare the annualized value of wealth, we use a measure
of pre-retirement earnings. Households are asked about earnings from current jobs in every wave,
and prior jobs in the wave in which they enter the sample. Thus, by collecting information from
each wave, we can assemble information on the pre-retirement earnings of most sample members.
For our measure of pre-retirement earnings, we calculate the average (in 2006 dollars) of current
earnings (if working) and \last job" earnings (if not working) from each wave.25
4 Findings on Wealth and Adequacy
Table 1 provides a breakdown of the components of comprehensive wealth for 1998 and 2006,
among households in which the older household member is at least 55 years old.26 The largest
components of comprehensive wealth are nonnancial wealth (mostly housing) and Social Security
wealth, which together make up about half of total wealth in both years. Total comprehensive
wealth grew by nearly a third between 1998 and 2006, with much of the growth coming from the
run-up in housing wealth over this time period. The housing boom delivered larger wealth gains
to higher-wealth households|the share of housing wealth held by the top decile of comprehensive
wealth increased from 44 to 55 percent.27
Table 2 provides a summary of our wealth and adequacy measures. Median comprehensive
wealth grew in real terms from $500,000 in 1998 to $591,000 in 2006. Again we see that the
growth in wealth was not evenly distributed: the 90th percentile grew by 14 percent while the
10th percentile grew by about 1 percent. Median annualized wealth grew just a bit from $33,000
to $36,000 per person per year. Here the inequality of growth is even more striking: the 90th
percentile grew by 25 percent, while the 10th percentile was essentially unchanged.
23Future employee contributions to DC plans will be made out of labor income, so we do not include them here.
24This is the same assumption as that used in the Social Security Administration's intermediate projection (SSA,
2006a).
25Because employees sometimes move to part-time status before retiring, we scale up part-time earnings to their
full-time equivalent.
26All dollar gures are adjusted to 2006 dollars using the CPI-U.
27Because housing wealth plays such a large role in comprehensive wealth and yet may be imperfectly consumable,
and because housing prices reached a peak in 2006, below we perform a simulation exercise in which we recalculate
our wealth and adequacy measures after reducing nonnancial wealth by 50 percent.
9Looking at our adequacy measures, we nd that the median ratio of comprehensive wealth to
poverty-line wealth rose from 3.51 in 1998 to 3.91 in 2006. The 90th percentile holds more than 10
times poverty wealth, while the 10th percentile is right around the poverty level in both years. The
distributions are quite consistent in the two years, with a bit more than half of households holding
more than three times poverty wealth, and about a quarter between 1.5 and three times poverty.
The share with less than 1.5 times poverty was 18 percent in both 1998 and 2006.
For our \replacement rate" measure, we nd that the median ratio of annualized wealth to
pre-retirement earnings was 1.08 in 1998 and 1.05 in 2006. The 10th percentile was barely changed,
at about 0.45, while the 90th percentile grew from 2.89 to 3.22. The distribution of this measure
also remained steady from 1998 to 2006, with just over half of households experiencing replacement
rates of at least 100 percent, about a third between 50 percent and 100 percent, and about one in
eight below 50 percent of pre-retirement earnings.
Table 3 shows how our wealth measures vary with age and marital status. Single households
hold substantially less wealth at all age levels. Even on a per-person, per-year basis, our annualized
wealth measure shows higher wealth among married households.28 By age, we see that while
comprehensive wealth levels fall signicantly, annualized wealth actually increases. This is a pattern
we will explore in more detail with our age proles and in xed- and random-eect regression
specications below.
Comparing the youngest age group across the two years is particularly interesting because it
provides a comparison between the edge-of-retirement baby boomers (in 2006) and their immediate
elders when they were at the edge of retirement in 1998. We see that relative to their elders,
single baby boomers are approaching retirement with slightly less wealth ($390,000 vs. $423,000
in median comprehensive wealth, and $24,000 vs. $26,000 in median annualized wealth), while
married baby boomers are at essentially the same level as their elders.
Table 4 shows how our adequacy measures vary with age and marital status. The share of
married households in the 1998 sample falls from 57 percent among the youngest age category to
33 percent in the oldest. The 2006 sample shows a similar decline, from 61 percent to 35 percent (the
distribution of married households is reported in the table footnotes). According to the measures,
single households have signicantly less adequacy of wealth than married households, though even
single households appear reasonably well-o at the median. We generally see increasing adequacy
by age. Comparing the single baby boomer group to their elders, we see that the baby boomers
tend to have a bit lower adequacy. Nevertheless, the overall adequacy of the single baby boomer
group appears to be reasonably healthy, with wealth of about 2.3 times the poverty level in 2006,
and annualized wealth at about 82 percent of pre-retirement earnings. At the 10th percentile,
however, single baby boomers appear to have a relatively low level of resources, with wealth at just
about 70 percent of the poverty level and annualized wealth at less than a third of pre-retirement
28Recall that the annuity factor adjusts for economies of scale within married households.
10earnings.
The distribution of adequacy measures reported in Table 5 indicates that in all age groups,
the vast majority of households with wealth less than 1.5 times poverty are single households.29
Nearly a third of single baby boomers are in this group, compared to only 7 percent of married
baby boomers.30 These shares are a bit higher than the comparable shares of their elders when
they were the same age. The \replacement rate" measure shows a similar pattern, with about
24 percent of single baby boomers in the \inadequate" group (i.e. annualized wealth less than 50
percent of pre-retirement earnings), compared to 8 percent of married boomers. These shares are
also higher than the comparable shares of the older generation just before retirement. Again we
see improving adequacy with age.
These results lead to the question of whether we should be worried about the nancial prepara-
tion of baby boomers. One answer seems to be that if we do worry, we should worry largely about
the single baby boomers, who are much more likely to have \inadequate" resources than their mar-
ried equivalents. Additionally, single baby boomers show a higher incidence of inadequacy than
their elders when they were the same age. On the other hand, Table 4 showed that even among
single boomers, the median household appears to have reasonably adequate wealth. Thus, even
focusing on the adequacy of single baby boomers, the concern might be limited to the lower half of
the distribution. Within this part of the distribution, however, households may be forced to choose
between, on the one hand, accepting very low resources in retirement, and on the other, remaining
in the workforce longer than they had anticipated. Since we value future compensation according to
self-reported ages of expected Social Security receipt, delayed retirement can substantially increase
the measured adequacy of resources among lower-wealth households.
5 Age Proles of Wealth and Adequacy
Each of the tables discussed above hinted at increasing age proles of annualized wealth and ade-
quacy. We make use of the full distribution of ages in our sample data to estimate non-parametric
age proles of each of our wealth and adequacy measures in 1998 and 2006.31 Figure 1 shows the age
proles of median comprehensive wealth and median annualized wealth in 1998 and 2006. Com-
prehensive wealth declines steadily with age|mechanically, as present values fall with declining
survival probability, and behaviorally, as households consume their stocks of wealth over time. The
29Breaking down these singles into gender and marital status categories, we nd that the majority of the singles
with less than 1.5 times poverty wealth are widowed women. In 2006, females accounted for about 80 percent of
singles with less than 1.5 times poverty wealth. (The breakdown shows similar patterns in 1998.) Of these, slightly
more than 38 percent were divorced or separated, 9 percent were never married, and 53 percent were widows. In
contrast, single men in this wealth category were much more likely to be divorced.
30Note that about 61 percent of the baby boomer sample households were married in 2006.
31The gures plot smoothed proles of median wealth and adequacy by age. Since households can (and usually do)
change marital status over long periods of retirement time, we do not present separate proles for single and married
households.
11proles for the two years are very similar, with slightly higher wealth at all ages in 2006. Annualized
wealth remains relatively 
at until around age 75 or so, and then it tends to rise throughout the
remainder of retirement. The rise in annualized wealth is especially apparent in 2006, which shows
an increase of 30 to 40 percent from ages in the early 70s to those in the late 80s. This pattern
of rising annualized wealth suggests that households are not consuming their stocks of wealth as
quickly as their survival probabilities are falling.32
Figure 2 shows the estimated age proles of our adequacy measures. Here we see a bit of
divergence between the two years: in 1998, the poverty measure of adequacy falls a bit until about
age 75, while in 2006 it holds fairly steady. After 75, it rises, particularly in 2006. This could
re
ect the dierent experiences of housing wealth in the respective time periods|for example, the
run-up in housing wealth by 2006 could lead to rapidly increasing adequacy measures among older
households, if housing wealth were increasing faster than older households could consume it. The
replacement rate measure shows a similar prole in both 1998 and 2006, remaining 
at until about
75 and then increasing rapidly. In addition to the eect of the housing boom, replacement rates
can rise with age due to cohort dierences: older cohorts typically received lower real earnings than
younger cohorts.
6 Sensitivity Analysis and Simulations
6.1 Real and Nominal Interest Rates
Table 6 shows how our calculations of comprehensive and annualized wealth would dier under
dierent assumptions on real and nominal interest rates. As described in the appendix, real rates
are used to discount in
ation-indexed streams of income such as Social Security and welfare benets
(as well as future poverty lines), while nominal rates are used to discount unindexed streams (such
as most private pension income). Our baseline assumption is a real rate of 2.5 percent and a
nominal rate of 4.5 percent. Reducing the real rate by 1.5 percentage points increases our wealth
measures by 8 to 9 percent, while decreasing the real rate by 1.5 percent decreases the measures by
about 7 percent. Changing our in
ation assumption has a more modest eect. Decreasing in
ation
from 2 percent to 0.5 percent increases our wealth measures by about 1 percent, while increasing
in
ation by the same amount leads to a reduction in our wealth measures of about 1 percent.
6.2 Housing, Social Security, and Medical Costs
Next, we consider more carefully the roles played by housing, Social Security, and medical costs
in our estimates of wealth. Table 7 shows the impact on our wealth and adequacy measures of
32Below, we test whether this pattern holds up within households over time in a regression context. We also
examine the possible role of dierential mortality in driving these patterns.
12four experiments: counting only half of nonnancial wealth, setting the real growth of nonnancial
wealth between 1998 and 2006 to zero,33 counting only 75 percent of Social Security wealth, and
subtracting the expected present value of out-of-pocket medical expenses from wealth.
The housing experiment is meant to capture two phenomena: rst, that housing wealth is
imperfectly liquid and many households may be unwilling or unable to fully annuitize its value,
and second, that housing prices have dropped signicantly since their peak in 2006.34 We nd
that counting only half of nonnancial assets takes about 10 to 20 percent o of the annualized
value of wealth, with the largest eect on older households, for whom nonnancial assets make up
a larger share of wealth. Moving to the experiment where we set the real growth of nonnancial
assets to zero, we see that the highest wealth households experience the largest drop in wealth
adequacy. The lowest wealth categories, in contrast, actually show a slight increase in adequacy,
which would make sense if lower wealth households depleted some of their housing wealth over the
8-year sample period. At the median, zero housing growth induces about a 5 percent decline in our
wealth adequacy measures.
The Social Security experiment is meant to capture the eects of an (unexpected) 25 percent
cut in Social Security benets on household wealth. This is a fairly simplistic policy simulation
meant to capture the eects of reforms that might be necessary in order to restore the Social
Security program to long-run solvency.35 This simulation produces similar results to the housing
experiment, except that the Social Security cuts have the largest impact on younger households
(who have larger Social Security wealth in present value, due to higher survival probabilities).
The medical expense experiment is meant to capture the eects of rising medical costs on
household wealth. To the extent that medical costs represent largely exogenous shocks to household
resources, our standard measure of annualized wealth could overstate available resources for other
consumption goods; if medical costs are rising over time, the adequacy of a given stock of wealth
could be lower than it appears. We implement this experiment by subtracting from wealth the
present value of expected out-of-pocket medical costs, computed as the trend expenses implied
by a random eects regression of observed log medical costs on age, education, sex, and a set of
time dummies. The results indicate that adjusting for expected medical costs has only a modest
eect on annualized wealth in absolute terms, reducing it by between $1,000 and $2,000 across the
percentile distribution. At the lowest percentiles, however, this absolute reduction implies a large
drop in percentage terms, in the range of 10 to 20 percent of annualized wealth.
33As Robert Shiller notes (2006), the real price of houses in the U.S. remained almost unchanged from 1890 to
the end of the 1990s. Setting the real growth of nancial assets to zero is meant to approximate the long-run trend
in house prices. We construct our measures of wealth adequacy for this counterfactual experiment by choosing a
balanced panel of households in 1998 and 2006 and replacing the 2006 value of nonnancial assets with the 1998
value, adjusted for in
ation.
34Between June 2006 and January 2008, the Case-Shiller composite index of house prices fell about 13 percent.
35We characterize the experiment as unexpected because we are not modeling any household saving responses. In
practice, any benet cuts would likely be phased in gradually for younger workers.
13In our nal simulation, we estimate the eect of adjusting for housing, Social Security, and
medical costs all at the same time. The cumulative eect of these changes can be substantial,
ranging from 25 to 40 percent of the unadjusted measure of annualized wealth. In general, the
biggest percentage reductions occur at the 10th percentile of the distribution for pre-retirement
households, who tend to have the lowest levels of nancial wealth and future pension income.
6.3 Dierential Mortality by Education and Marital Status
We use the ocial SSA life tables because these are carefully constructed to be useful for analysis
of the probabilities of surviving to very old ages. These tables condition on age and gender, but
not on race, wealth, or marital status. To understand how dierential mortality across these
dimensions might aect our annualized wealth calculations, we experiment with an alternative
calibration of the survival function. We calculate dierential mortality probabilities using the
reported coecients from the Urban Institute's Model of Income in the Near Term, Version 5
(Smith, Favreault, Ratclie, Butrica, and Bakija, 2007), which estimates demographic transitions
using pooled data from the 1990{2001 Surveys of Income Program Participation and SSA les of
previous earnings and benets.
The mortality hazard model in MINT5 (Table 2-5 in the report) includes estimates for age,
education, and marital status. Using the SSA life tables as a baseline,36 we construct a function that
maps a household's demographic characteristics into a vector of unconditional survival probabilities
that we then use in computing new annualizing factors. After adjusting for dierential mortality,
we nd that our measures of annualized wealth change only slightly, generally on the order of less
than 5 percent of the unadjusted values. Lower income households experience a slight increase
in annualized wealth with the adjustment (due to their higher rates of mortality). The eect is
small, however, because these households tend to rely predominantly on Social Security benets,
which provide the same annuity income regardless of our assumptions about mortality. High school
graduates experience a rise in annualized wealth relative to college graduates, and single households
experience a rise relative to married households.
7 Regression Results
The life cycle model predicts that the amount of household wealth observed at any given point
in time should be a function of preferences, lifetime earnings, a history of shocks, and a set of
factors that aect future consumption decisions, such as bequest motives, changes in health status,
longevity, and other sources of precautionary saving. To see how some of these factors aect
36Setting the benchmark survival probabilities in the MINT to those of a married household with a high school
education, we adjust the SSA probabilities by multiplying them by the ratio of the MINT probabilities associated
with a given age, education, and marital status to the benchmark MINT probabilities.
14annualized wealth within households across time, we take advantage of the panel dimension of our
data and estimate regressions of log annualized wealth on household characteristics.
We use each of the 1998{2006 waves in the HRS (5 waves in total) and exclude observations
with respondents younger than 55. The covariates include information about age, education, race,
self-reported health, expectations about leaving bequests, expectations of longevity relative to life-
table predictions, and the shares of nancial and annuity wealth (e.g. DB and Social Security). In
addition, we include a full set of time dummies. The dependent variable of interest is the natural
logarithm of annualized wealth, truncated at zero.37
Our analysis treats married households and singles separately, and for each type of household,
we present estimates from both random eects and xed eects regressions. The random eects ap-
proach has the advantage that it uses both \between" and \within" information about households
to construct the coecient estimates. For our purposes, this is helpful because it allows us to gen-
erate estimates for important household variables, such as education and race, that do not change
over time. The random eects specication does, however, have a well-known drawback. Since
the estimator integrates out the unobserved random eects, it only produces unbiased estimates if
the unobservables are uncorrelated with the observables. In the context of our analysis, potential
sources of correlated unobserved heterogeneity include the relationship between risk aversion and
savings behavior, strategic altruism tying bequests to implicit (and unobserved) \insurance" pro-
vided by one's children, and links between risk aversion, health, and longevity. The xed eects
specication allows one to control for this type of unobserved heterogeneity by dierencing out the
observed and unobserved xed eects altogether. The cost, however, is a loss of between-household
information and generally a loss of precision.
Table 8 reports the coecient estimates for each specication. Beginning with the rst column|
the random eects regression for married couples|the estimates indicate a positive and signicant
age trend on annualized wealth. That is, even within households, annualized wealth tends to
increase over time, suggesting that older households have not been spending down their wealth as
quickly as their survival probabilities are falling.
College graduates tend to have about 48 percent more annualized wealth than high school
dropouts, and high school graduates have about 21 percent more. We nd sharp dierences by race,
with annualized wealth of non-whites about 17 percent lower than that of whites, and annualized
wealth among Hispanics lower by about 23 percent. Households with respondents in fair health
report 4 percent less in annualized wealth, while those in poor health are 9 percent lower. On the
other hand, respondents in the middle third of the medical expense distribution report about 3
percent higher annualized wealth, and those in the top third report 4 percent more wealth. This
result is likely picking up the \luxury good" aspect to some medical expenses, such as private
nursing homes.
37The truncation eliminates only the handful of observations with negative comprehensive wealth holdings.
15Households strongly expecting to leave a bequest larger than $100,000 have about 25 percent
more annualized wealth relative to households not anticipating leaving a bequest. If we add the
bequest estimates for the spouse, the eects are even stronger. According to the standard life
cycle model, a bequest motive should increase annualized resources as a household ages because
the intended bequest remains roughly constant while the number of life years over which it is
annualized shrinks with each passing year.
The HRS asks respondents about the probability of living about 10 more years. Interestingly,
however, we nd no statistically signicant eect of expected longevity on annualized wealth, and
the negative signs on the respondent's coecients are generally inconsistent with the predictions of
the life cycle model (i.e. households that expect to die earlier should draw down their assets more
rapidly) and the eects of dierential mortality (i.e. lower-wealth households can generally expect
to die sooner than higher-wealth households).
The composition of assets is also related to the level of annualized wealth. We nd that those
with higher shares of nancial wealth (relative to nonnancial wealth) are more wealthy: a per-
centage point higher nancial wealth share is associated with about 0.3 percent more annualized
wealth. Those with higher annuitized wealth shares (i.e. wealth in the form of Social Security,
pensions, etc.) are less wealthy: a percentage point higher annuitized wealth share is associated
with 0.5 percent less annualized wealth.
The random eects estimates for single households share the signs and signicance levels of the
estimates for married couples, but with slightly larger magnitudes. In the xed eects specication,
many of coecient estimates are much less precisely estimated. Self-reported health, bequests, and
the shares of nancial and annuity wealth remain signicant and maintain the same sign pattern as
in the random eects specication. In addition, the coecient estimate on age for married couples
increases when we move to the xed eects specication, but the estimate is not signicant at the
5-percent level.
8 Conclusions
Comparing comprehensive wealth to poverty-line wealth, and the annualized value of wealth to
pre-retirement earnings, we nd that the median older U.S. household appears to hold adequate
resources. Median household wealth is about 3.9 times poverty wealth in 2006, and the median
\replacement rate" of earnings is about 105 percent. However, about 18 percent of households
have less wealth than would be needed to generate 150 percent of poverty-line income over their
expected future lifetimes, and 13 percent of households experience replacement rates of less than
50 percent. Most of the households with \inadequate" resources are single.
Comparing the leading edge of the baby boom generation to their immediate elders, we nd that
overall, the baby boomers have slightly less wealth, but are generally about as well situated as their
16elders were at the same age. Again, the main group of concern is single households: the incidence
of \inadequate" resources among single boomers is fairly high, and is a bit higher than that of their
elders at the same age. On the other hand, we nd that even among single boomers, the median
household appears to have reasonably adequate wealth. Thus the concern might be limited to the
lower half of the single boomer distribution. One implication for these households might be that
they nd they will not be able to retire as early as they expect to. Since we value their future
compensation according to their self-report on when they expect to begin Social Security receipt,
these households can signicantly improve their adequacy outlook by delaying retirement longer
than they say they will.
Finally, we nd a rising age prole of annualized wealth, even within households over time and
after controlling for other factors, such as bequest motives, health, longevity, and medical costs.
We interpret this as suggesting that older households are not spending their wealth as quickly as
their survival probabilities are falling.
We close with a few caveats about our results. First, our measures of adequacy are based on
expected values, and thus do not account for the utility value of substantial risks that arise from
uncertain lifetimes, medical expenses and asset returns. Thus a risk-averse household with \ade-
quate" wealth by our measures may not have enough wealth after accounting for the eect of these
risks on utility. Second, our analysis focuses on households aged 55 and older in 1998{2006, which
includes the leading edge of baby boomers, but not younger boomers or succeeding generations.
Our ndings therefore do not provide evidence about the adequacy of retirement savings among
younger cohorts. Finally, our results should not be taken to imply that current household savings
are necessarily sucient in the long-run macroeconomic sense. Given the broad demographic trends
at work over the next half century, including declining fertility and increasing longevity, a higher
household savings rate could, by increasing the size of the capital stock, signicantly reduce the
burden of higher taxes or lower spending that will otherwise fall on following generations.
17References
Bernheim, B. D. (1987): \The Economic Eects of Social Security: Toward a Reconciliation of
Theory and Measurement," Journal of Public Economics, 33, 273{304.
(1992): \Is the Baby Boom Generation Preparing Adequately for Retirement?," Discussion
paper, Merrill Lynch.
Brown, J. R., and J. M. Poterba (2000): \Joint Life Annuities and Annuity Demand by
Married Couples," The Journal of Risk and Insurance, 67(4), 527{553.
Browning, M., and A. Lusardi (1996): \Household Saving: Micro Theories and Micro Facts,"
Journal of Economic Literature, 34(4), 1797{1855.
CBO (1993): \Baby Boomers in Retirement: An Early Perspective," Congressional Budget Oce.
Census (2008): \Poverty Thresholds," http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/threshld.
html.
Coronado, J. L., D. Maki, and B. Weitzer (2007): \Retiring on the House? Cross-Cohort
Dierences in Housing Wealth," in Redening Retirement, ed. by B. Madrian, O. S. Mitchell, and
B. J. Soldo, pp. 296{321. Oxford University Press.
Engen, E. M., W. G. Gale, and C. E. Uccello (1999): \The Adequacy of Household Saving,"
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1999(2), 65{187.
(2005): \Eects Of Stock Market Fluctuations On the Adequacy of Retirement Wealth
Accumulation," Review of Income and Wealth, 51(3).
Gale, W. G., and K. M. Pence (2006): \Are Successive Generations Getting Wealthier, and If
So, Why? Evidence from the 1990s," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, I, 155{234.
Gustman, A. L., O. S. Mitchell, A. A. Samwick, and T. L. Steinmeier (1999): \Pension
and Social Security Wealth in the Health and Retirement Study," in Wealth, Work, and Health:
Innovations in Survey Measurement in the Social Sciences, ed. by R. Willis, pp. 150{208. Ann
Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Gustman, A. L., and T. L. Steinmeier (1999): \Eects of Pensions on Saving: Analysis with
Data from the Health and Retirement Study," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public
Policy, 50, 271{324.
(2004): \What People Don't Know About Their Pensions and Social Security: An Analysis
Using Linked Data from the Health and Retirement Study," in Public Policies and Private
Pensions, ed. by W. G. Gale, J. B. Shoven, and M. J. Warshawsky, pp. 57{119. Washington, DC:
Brookings Institution.
(2005): \Imperfect Knowledge of Social Security and Pensions," Industrial Relations,
44(2), 373{397.
18Haveman, R., K. Holden, B. Wolfe, and A. Romanov (2007): \Assessing the Maintenance of
Savings Suciency over the First Decade of Retirement," International Tax and Public Finance,
14, 481{502.
Haveman, R., K. Holden, B. Wolfe, and S. Sherlund (2006): \Do Newly Retired Workers
in the United States Have Sucient Resources to Maintain Well-Being?," Economic Inquiry, 44,
249{264.
Hurd, M. D., and S. Rohwedder (2006): \Alternative Measures of Replacement Rates," Michi-
gan Retirement Research Center Working Paper 2006-132.
Lusardi, A., and O. S. Mitchell (2007): \Baby Boomer Retirement Security: The Roles of
Planning, Financial Literacy, and Housing Wealth," Journal of Monetary Economics, pp. 205{
224.
Mitchell, O. S., and J. F. Moore (1998): \Can Americans Aord to Retire? New Evidence
on Retirement Saving Adequacy," Journal of Risk and Insurance, 65(3), 371{400.
Mitchell, O. S., J. M. Poterba, M. J. Warshawsky, and J. R. Brown (1999): \New
Evidence on the Money's Worth of Individual Annuities," American Economic Review, 89, 1299{
1318.
Moore, J., and O. S. Mitchell (2000): Forecasting Retirement Needs and Retirement
Wealthchap. Projected Retirement Wealth and Saving Adequacy. Philadelphia, University of
Pennsylvania Press.
Munnell, A. H., and M. Soto (2005): \What Replacement Rate Do Households Actually
Experience in Retirement?," CRR Working Paper 2005-10.
Scholz, J. K., A. Seshadri, and S. Khitatrakun (2006): \Are Americans Saving \Optimally"
For Retirement?," Journal of Political Economy, 114, 607{643.
Shiller, R. J. (2006): \Long-Term Perspectives on the Current Boom in Home Prices,"
Economists' Voice.
Smith, K. E., M. M. Favreault, C. Ratcliffe, B. Butrica, and J. Bakija (2007): \Mod-
eling Income in the Near Term 5," The Urban Institute, Final Report.
SSA (2006a): The 2006 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Old-Age and Sur-
vivors Insurance and Disability Insurance Trust Funds. Social Security Administration.
(2006b): Period Life Table, 2002. Social Security Administration.
Wolff, E. N. (2002): Retirement Insecurity: The Income Shortfalls Awaiting the Soon-to-Retire.
Economic Policy Institute.
(2007): \The Retirement Wealth of the Baby Boom Generation," Journal of Monetary
Economics, 54, 1{40.
19A1: Data Source and Calculation Methods
Data Source
Our primary data sources are the RAND HRS Data File, and the 1998{2006 RAND-Enhanced Fat
Files. The Fat Files are HRS data les that have been compiled by RAND and are often easier to
use than the raw HRS data les. The RAND HRS Data File is a longitudinal le in which selected
variables have been linked across the eight waves of the HRS. This le includes RAND-generated
imputations of missing values. Many variables necessary for our analysis, notably including detailed
DB and DC pension information, are not included in the RAND HRS Data File. For these variables,
we use the RAND-Enhanced Fat Files, which include virtually all of the raw HRS data.
A number of income and wealth variables from the RAND-Enhanced Fat File are missing for
some households, but in the later waves, the HRS design includes \unfolding brackets" that provide
ranges of values for many of the variables that are missing. We use the brackets to assign imputed
values for households who indicate that they have a certain type of income or asset, but do not
report the actual amount. If we have information indicating that a respondent should have a value
for a particular variable but no information on a range for that value then we assign the missing
value a zero. Otherwise, we apply a hot-deck imputation to the unfolding brackets in order to
match the distribution of actual values given by respondents.
Note that variables taken from the RAND HRS Data File are imputed by RAND using a
dierent methodology. RAND uses a model-based imputation method and imputes more values
than we do. However, we have compared the RAND imputation distribution to our imputation
distribution for several variables and cannot nd any signicant dierences. For more specic
information on the RAND imputation method, please refer to their HRS Data Documentation,
Version H. In all calculations, we use the HRS household analysis weights.
Present Value Calculations
Dened Benet Pensions
Calculating the actuarial present value of future DB pension payments requires a few assumptions.
The HRS includes questions about both current pension benets (for retirees) and expected future
pension benets (for those still working). Households are asked about the (current or expected)
pension amount (and start date, if they have not yet begun), cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs),
and survivors' benets.38 In the case of working households, we use the expected pension at
retirement; this serves to include the value of benets not yet accrued. This is parallel to our
inclusion of expected future compensation in our calculation of comprehensive wealth.
We express the actuarial present value of DB payments for a plan that pays an annual amount
38Thus, we are using self-reported pension data to calculate pension wealth. The HRS also includes supplementary
employer-provided pension data that in some cases may provide a more accurate measure of pension benets (see
Gustman and Steinmeier (1999)). The main dierences between the self-reported measures that we use and the
supplemental data involve workers' expectations of future pensions. Because most of our sample consists of retirees
who are currently receiving pensions, we expect our results to be robust to our reliance on the self-reported data for
workers.
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where  is the discount factor, ar and as are the ages of the respondent and the spouse at the
time of the survey, and  is the fraction of benets that will be passed on to the spouse in the
event that the respondent dies.39 The term  r(;ar) is the probability of the respondent's living to
age  conditional on being alive at age ar, while  s( + ;as) represents the conditional survival
probability of the spouse, where  is the age dierence between the spouse and the respondent.
Thus, the actuarial present value of pension wealth is just the annual pension benet multiplied
by the sum of discounted annual survival probabilities, with an extra term accounting for any
payments made to the spouse after the death of the respondent.40
The conditional survival probabilities are based on the one-year age- and sex-specic conditional
death probabilities in the Social Security Administration's 2002 Period Life Table (SSA, 2006b).
Period life tables provide a snapshot of the mortality conditions prevailing in a single year, rather
than the expected mortality experience of a given cohort over time. For young cohorts (e.g. children
born in 2002), one might expect actual longevity to be signicantly greater than shown in the 2002
period life table, since longevity generally improves over time. However, since our sample is of
Americans aged 55 and older in 1998-2006, we conclude that the 2002 period table is a reasonable
estimate of our sample's expected mortality experience.41
For DB plans with COLAs (about 40 percent of the reported plans), we use a discount factor
 equal to 1=(1 + r), where r is the real interest rate. For plans without COLAs, we set  equal to
1=(1 + i), where i is the nominal interest rate. The baseline results in the paper assume a baseline
nominal interest rate of 4.5 percent and a real interest rate of 2.5 percent, implying 2 percent
in
ation.
The HRS collects information on multiple pension plans for respondents and their spouses.
Applying equation (A-1), we compute present values for each of these and then sum them to arrive
at our nal calculation for current pensions. Some current workers report that they expect to
receive lump-sum payouts from their DB plans upon retirement. To include these plans, we simply
discount the lump sum back to the current age.
39We ignore non-spouse beneciaries. If there is no spouse, we set  to zero.
40Bernheim (1987) argues that actuarial discounting is inappropriate for risk-averse individuals facing imperfect
annuity markets, because such individuals would attach additional value to the otherwise unavailable insurance
product. He suggests straight discounting (ignoring the probability of death) instead. However, he points out that
his analysis rests on the premise that individuals place no value on the death-contingent value of assets (i.e. that
there are no bequest motives). We treat the household as a unit, and explicitly value the death-contingent component
of each individual's assets (e.g. survivors' benets and life insurance). Thus we use the actuarial present value of DB
and Social Security benets. Note that we are only computing the amount of wealth, and not the utility value of
that wealth. Similarly, we make no adjustment for the utility value of risk (e.g. longevity risk or the risk of a large
medical-expense shock).
41Note that these survival probabilities average together all households. Thus, to the extent that, for example, lower-
wealth respondents face lower survival probabilities than higher-wealth respondents, our calculations will overstate
the pension wealth of the lower-wealth groups, while understating the pension wealth of the higher-wealth groups.
This bias could, in turn, aect the distributional calculations performed later in the paper. Section 6 above discusses
how our results change with dierential mortality by education and marital status.
21Social Security
Computing the present value of of Social Security is quite similar to calculating DB wealth. The
HRS includes questions about both current benets for retirees and expected benets for workers.
Let ssr
 and sss
+ denote the current or expected annual social security benets of the respondent
and the spouse at ages  and  +  respectively. The actuarial present value of household Social
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is the conditional probability of both household members being alive, and
	2 =  r(;ar) +  s( + ;as)   2 r(;ar) s( + ;as)
is the conditional probability of exactly one household member being alive.42 The rst bracketed
term in equation (A-2) captures the fact that if both household members are alive, their total
benets will generally equal the sum of their individual amounts. The second term in the brackets
re
ects the rules governing survivors benets, whereby a retirement-age widow or widower typically
receives 100% of the spouse's benets if these exceed their own benet amount.43 Since Social
Security benets are adjusted for in
ation, we discount using the real interest rate:  = 1=(1 + r).
Respondents in the HRS are asked directly about the amount of current or expected spousal
benets. We take these amount at face value and assume that the reported benets already re
ect
any adjustments due to the Social Security rules (e.g. the fact that individuals are typically entitled
to the maximum of their own benets and 50% of their spouse's).
Insurance, Annuities, and Welfare
Life insurance wealth is a bit dierent from DB or Social Security wealth because life insurance is a
contingent asset and therefore less liquid than other wealth components. Nonetheless, to ignore it
would be to understate the total resources available to nance household consumption in retirement.
We only include policies in which the spouse is named as a primary beneciary.
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where FVr and FVs denote the face values of the insurance policies owned by the respondent and
the spouse, and Pr and Ps are the corresponding annualized premiums. The rst term in equation
42To see the intuition of this expression, note that the equation for 	2 is simply a rearrangement of  
r(1    
s) +
 
s(1    
r).
43Widows older than 60 but under the full retirement age generally receive 71-99% of the workers benet amount.
22(A-3) is the expected payout of the respondent's insurance policy at age , where the expectation
is taken over the probability that the respondent dies at a particular age  while the spouse is
still alive. The second term in the equation is the expected value of the premium payment, which
occurs in the event that the respondent is still alive at age . The third and fourth terms are the
same expectations applied to the spouse's policy.
Note that the actuarial present value of insurance would be zero if premiums were actuarially fair
and perfectly observed in the data. However, the calculation of life insurance wealth is constrained
by data limitations. We do not observe in the HRS the length of term policies, or their premiums.44
In the absence of any data, we assume that term policies will remain in force throughout retirement,
and that their premiums have been pre-paid (i.e. are zero in each year going forward). Thus, the
only premiums that we account for are those associated with whole life policies. In addition, the
HRS does not collect information on the cash value of whole life policies. As a result, we treat
term life insurance and whole-life insurance identically in this calculation. That is, we ignore the
cash value of whole life policies and instead calculate the present expected value of the face value,
regardless of the type of policy.45
Our calculations of wealth from annuities and welfare payments are more straightforward. The
formula for calculating the actuarial present value of annuities (ANPV ) exactly parallels equation
(A-1), where we make similar adjustments for COLAs and survivor benets. Our measure of
expected welfare payments includes veteran's benets, food stamps, Supplemental Security Income
(SSI), and other welfare. In this calculation, we assume that individuals who are currently receiving
these payments will continue to receive the same in
ation-indexed welfare payments as long as
they live, and that those not currently receiving these payments never will|i.e. we do not model
transitions in and out of welfare-receipt status. Since welfare benets are typically indexed to
in
ation, we discount this stream of expected welfare payments using the real interest rate and the
relevant conditional survival probabilities.
44Term life insurance policies simply pay out the face value to the beneciary in the event of the death of the
insured, while whole life policies also include a cash-value account in which assets accrue that can be borrowed
against or redeemed upon cancellation of the policy.
45Note that if we were able to include cash values as a separate liquid asset, we would need to adjust down the
measure of face value accordingly in order to prevent double counting. We do not estimate the extra utility value of
more liquid wealth in any of our measures.





















Wage Wealth 115.2 0.28 0.14 0.47 156.1 0.32 0.14 0.46
Financial Wealth 122.8 0.89 0.15 0.53 147.9 0.91 0.14 0.59
Nonnancial Wealth 202.6 0.89 0.24 0.44 352.7 0.90 0.33 0.55
Retirement Accounts 76.2 0.42 0.09 0.58 120.2 0.44 0.11 0.68
DB Pension Wealth 102.9 0.52 0.12 0.37 86.1 0.49 0.08 0.35
Annuity & LI Wealth 5.4 0.05 0.01 0.34 12.8 0.12 0.01 0.51
Soc. Sec. Wealth 188.3 0.97 0.23 0.18 188.0 0.95 0.17 0.17
Other Transfer Wealth 14.4 0.15 0.02 0.20 16.8 0.14 0.02 0.12
Total: Comp. Wealth 827.7 1.00 1.00 0.40 1080.4 1.00 1.00 0.47
Means reported in thousands of 2006 dollars. See text for details of wealth calculations. Sample size is
12,676 in 1998 and 11,106 in 2006.
1Share of households with nonzero value of this wealth.
2Aggregate share of this wealth in comprehensive wealth.
3Share of this wealth held by the top 10% of households (ranked by CW).
Table 2: Summary of Wealth and Adequacy Measures
1998 2006
Percentiles of Wealth and Adequacy Measures
10th 50th 90th 10th 50th 90th
Comprehensive Wealth 117.5 500.0 1753.4 118.9 591.0 2005.3
Annualized Comp. Wealth 10.8 32.9 94.3 10.4 35.7 116.9
Ratio of CW to Poverty Wealth 1.09 3.51 10.16 1.05 3.91 12.52
Ratio of ACW to Pre-Ret. Earn. 0.45 1.08 2.89 0.43 1.05 3.22
Percent Distribution of Adequacy Measures
1.5 1.5-3.0 3.0 1.5 1.5-3.0 3.0
CW to Poverty Wealth 0.18 0.25 0.57 0.18 0.21 0.61
0.5 0.5-1.0 1.0 0.5 0.5-1.0 1.0
ACW to Pre-Retirement Earnings 0.12 0.32 0.55 0.13 0.33 0.53
Dollar gures in thousands of 2006 dollars. Sample size is 12,676 in 1998 and 11,106 in
2006.
24Table 3: Measures of Wealth, by Age and Marital Status
1998 2006
Percentiles: 10th 50th 90th 10th 50th 90th
Comprehensive Wealth
Age 55-62 Single 129.4 422.7 1278.6 116.8 389.5 1256.5
Married 470.8 1191.9 2841.6 464.4 1180.3 3086.8
Age 63-75 Single 104.4 284.8 933.3 100.6 303.9 1146.1
Married 317.0 796.1 2065.0 331.4 905.9 2555.3
Age 76+ Single 58.9 194.0 661.6 54.5 214.9 975.1
Married 209.0 531.9 1498.4 199.9 602.6 1870.9
Annualized Comprehensive Wealth
Age 55-62 Single 7.9 25.7 82.1 7.3 23.6 76.5
Married 15.6 39.7 95.6 15.4 39.7 103.6
Age 63-75 Single 9.0 24.6 83.0 8.7 26.4 98.2
Married 14.9 36.0 91.2 14.7 40.2 114.0
Age 76+ Single 10.2 32.5 119.1 10.4 38.5 175.9
Married 15.6 39.6 113.0 15.8 47.5 150.1
Figures in thousands of 2006 dollars. Married shares by age group are .57, .50,
and .33 in 1998 and .61, .54, .35 in 2006. Sample size is 12,676 in 1998 and
11,106 in 2006.
25Table 4: Measures of Wealth Adequacy, by Age and Marital
Status
1998 2006
Percentiles: 10th 50th 90th 10th 50th 90th
Ratio of CW to Poverty Wealth
Age 55-62 Single 0.77 2.48 7.95 0.71 2.28 7.40
Married 1.85 4.72 11.36 1.83 4.70 12.43
Age 63-75 Single 0.89 2.42 8.10 0.86 2.61 9.63
Married 1.77 4.30 10.91 1.76 4.80 13.60
Age 76+ Single 0.93 2.98 10.61 0.95 3.57 16.13
Married 1.76 4.46 12.79 1.76 5.28 17.00
Ratio of ACW to Pre-Retirement Earnings
Age 55-62 Single 0.35 0.89 1.79 0.27 0.82 2.15
Married 0.60 1.10 2.15 0.54 1.02 2.04
Age 63-75 Single 0.35 0.92 2.59 0.32 0.90 2.71
Married 0.51 1.18 3.10 0.56 1.13 2.85
Age 76+ Single 0.49 1.47 7.33 0.44 1.56 7.82
Married 0.61 1.64 6.55 0.57 1.52 6.93
See text for details of adequacy measures. Married shares by age group
are .57, .50, and .33 in 1998 and .61, .54, .35 in 2006. Sample size is
12,676 in 1998 and 11,106 in 2006.
26Table 5: Distributions of Adequacy Measures, by Age and Mar-
ital Status
Distribution of CW Ratio
1998 2006
1.5 1.5-3.0 3.0 1.5 1.5-3.0 3.0
Age 55-62 Single 0.30 0.28 0.42 0.34 0.27 0.39
Married 0.06 0.19 0.74 0.07 0.17 0.75
Age 63-75 Single 0.31 0.29 0.41 0.32 0.24 0.44
Married 0.07 0.23 0.70 0.07 0.21 0.73
Age 76+ Single 0.24 0.26 0.50 0.23 0.22 0.55
Married 0.06 0.23 0.70 0.07 0.19 0.75
Distribution of ACW Ratio
1998 2006
0.5 0.5-1.0 1.0 0.5 0.5-1.0 1.0
Age 55-62 Single 0.18 0.42 0.40 0.24 0.38 0.38
Married 0.06 0.34 0.60 0.08 0.40 0.52
Age 63-75 Single 0.21 0.33 0.46 0.23 0.32 0.45
Married 0.10 0.30 0.61 0.07 0.34 0.59
Age 76+ Single 0.11 0.24 0.65 0.12 0.21 0.67
Married 0.06 0.20 0.74 0.07 0.23 0.69
See text for details of adequacy measures. Married shares by age group
are .57, .50, and .33 in 1998 and .61, .54, .35 in 2006. Sample size is
12,676 in 1998 and 11,106 in 2006.




Real=1.0%, Nom.=3.0% 8.3 9.2
Real=4.0%, Nom.=6.0% -7.3 -7.0
Real=2.5%, Nom.=3.0% 1.1 0.8
Real=2.5%, Nom.=6.0% -0.8 -1.1
Table entries show percent change from the
2006 baseline of a 2.5% real rate and 4.5% nom-
inal rate. Sample size is 11,106 in 2006.
27Table 7: Simulations
Age Pctile Baseline -50% Housing
No House
Growth -25% SS -Med. Costs Combined
Annualized Wealth (thous. 2006 $)
Age 55-62 10th 9.7 9.1 11.0 8.4 9.0 7.2
50th 34.5 31.2 33.1 31.9 33.9 28.2
90th 93.6 82.9 85.2 90.2 93.3 79.0
Age 63-75 10th 10.5 9.8 10.7 8.6 9.9 7.4
50th 34.0 29.1 32.6 30.8 33.4 25.4
90th 105.3 87.1 93.3 102.2 104.6 82.7
Age 76+ 10th 11.6 10.9 12.6 9.3 10.9 8.1
50th 42.6 33.6 41.7 39.4 42.0 30.3
90th 167.2 132.5 154.4 164.5 166.7 128.0
Ratio of CW to Poverty Wealth
Age 55-62 10th 0.98 0.92 1.13 0.88 0.93 0.74
50th 3.87 3.48 3.75 3.61 3.82 3.15
90th 10.66 9.47 9.47 10.37 10.58 9.05
Age 63-75 10th 1.09 1.01 1.12 0.88 1.02 0.76
50th 3.79 3.23 3.61 3.45 3.73 2.80
90th 11.88 9.79 10.30 11.43 11.79 9.26
Age 76+ 10th 1.09 1.03 1.23 0.89 1.04 0.77
50th 4.17 3.35 4.17 3.86 4.12 3.01
90th 16.50 12.93 14.95 16.09 16.37 12.50
Ratio of ACW to Pre-Retirement Earnings
Age 55-62 10th 0.39 0.37 0.43 0.36 0.38 0.30
50th 0.95 0.86 0.91 0.88 0.93 0.78
90th 2.08 1.80 1.79 1.95 2.06 1.65
Age 63-75 10th 0.42 0.38 0.42 0.35 0.40 0.29
50th 1.05 0.90 0.99 0.94 1.03 0.78
90th 2.78 2.31 2.54 2.65 2.77 2.14
Age 76+ 10th 0.51 0.45 0.53 0.43 0.49 0.36
50th 1.54 1.28 1.50 1.42 1.52 1.13
90th 7.56 5.83 6.88 7.10 7.39 5.66
*\Baseline" is the original specication; \-50% Housing" counts only 50% of nonnancial assets;
\No House Growth" assumes zero real growth in non-nancial assets between 1998 and 2006 (for this
category, we compute statistics based on a balanced sample of households that were present in both
survey years); \-25% SS" imposes a 25% across-the-board cut in the PV of Social Security benets;
\-Med. Costs" subtracts the expected present value of out-of-pocket medical costs, where the trend
is computed from a random eect regression of log medical costs on household characteristics and
time dummies; and \Combined" computes comprehensive wealth with all of the adjustments except







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































29Figure 1: Age Proles of Wealth Measures







Thousands of 2006 Dollars
1998   
2006   
Median Comprehensive Wealth
Age







Thousands of 2006 Dollars
1998   
2006   
Median Annualized Comprehensive Wealth
Age
55 57 59 61 63 65 67 69 71 73 75 77 79 81 83 85 87 89









1998   
2006   
Median Ratio of CW to Poverty−Line Wealth
Age









1998   
2006   
Median Ratio of ACW to Pre−Retirement Earnings
Age
55 57 59 61 63 65 67 69 71 73 75 77 79 81 83 85 87 89
31